The blog war between Kerry Howley and Will Wilkinson on one side and Todd Seavey on the other has attracted the attention of other bloggers, including our own Elizabeth Nolan Brown, and it’s such an interesting controversy that I can’t help weighing in (thereby perfecting the symmetry described here). The basic dilemma is easy to explain: Everybody agrees that women are treated differently than men in ways that sometimes make their lives difficult and constrain their choices; everybody also agrees that most of this discrimination stops short of a gun to the head; Kerry thinks that social pressure is a kind of coercion that libertarians should care about; Todd thinks social pressure is, at most, coercion-lite, and therefore not something that libertarians have to oppose. (Some libertarians might, but, Hell, some libertarians hate asparagus and we don’t make a plank out of that, even if the asparagus-haters are objectively correct.)
Confronted with the obvious point that social pressure limits liberty—something everyone is willing to grant, I think—I can think of four possible responses:
1. Social pressure limits liberty and should therefore be eliminated. Nobody can tell me what to do, not even with their eyes.
2. Social pressure limits liberty and should therefore be made voluntary and contractual. I am only subject to the rules of communities I have agreed to join. You’re welcome to vacuum floors in pearls and a sun dress if that’s what you really want, and I’m free to wear jeans, go to graduate school, and make my husband do the vacuuming.
3. Social pressure limits liberty, but I kinda like involuntary communities. However, I think that discrimination on the basis of gender is illegitimate, so we should eliminate all social norms having to do with gender discrimination, just as we try to eliminate racist social norms because racism is illegitimate. Everything else can stay, even if it’s mildly coercive. (Who wants to get rid of family, nation, and every form of ethnic and cultural inheritance, and why do they hate the Good?)
4. Social pressure limits liberty. However. I notice that my libertarian paradise can only sustain itself in a world with stable communities and self-governing individuals, and the only thing capable of producing either is tradition. If I want to live among mature individuals capable of citizenship in a libertarian state, I’d better defend the social norms that make it possible to bring up those people. If I think that organic communities obviate the need for government intervention, then I’d better preserve those communities, even if they engage in soft coercion. If some of their norms treat women differently or even disadvantageously, that might be good or bad but, in any event, is a matter for that community to decide for itself.
Number 4 is the most interesting one here, because it suggests that feminism and libertarianism (or at least certain brands of it) might be at odds.
I don’t want to define feminism too narrowly, but it seems necessarily to involve gunning for the patriarchy, making feminism hostile to the institutions that right libertarians want to conserve. In other words: If you oppose government interference because you think it artificially disrupts traditional institutions, then you’ll also oppose feminists when they want to do the same thing, which is often. (Judging from this diavlog, Howley’s feminism wants to disrupt the traditional family a lot.) Number 3 is one way out of this that enables a girl to be both a right libertarian and a feminist, and if anyone wanted to explore that exception in another post I’d read it. That being said, number 4 is the kind of libertarian I am, which is why I don’t usually call myself a feminist. (That, and, as a postmodern femme, I’m way into gender roles.)
Howley says that the affinity between feminism and libertarianism has been masked by “various historical contingencies—the particularly puritanical brand of feminism popular three decades back, the ill-fated conservative/libertarian alliance forged in response to the cold war.” However, if there are legitimate, non-historical reasons why libertarianism might be friendly to or even depend on traditionalism (i.e. if fusionism is a philosophy and not just a coalition), then there are entire schools of libertarianism that have good reason to be hostile to feminism and its strained, artificial disruptions of traditional institutions. If your right libertarianism doesn’t sound like #4, or if your feminism is weirdly Burkean, then, of course, you’re fine, but I’d be curious to hear guesses as to how many right libertarians and feminists fall into those loopholes.
Last note: Todd can get away with saying that libertarianism and feminism don’t contradict because he considers libertarianism to be strictly political; lower taxes and property rights are good for goose and gander. I can’t get away with such a conciliatory position because, like Will Wilkinson, I think that everyone who wants small government wants small government for a reason, usually a philosophical one—you like individual freedom, you like non-state institutions like church and family, or whatever. If your reason for liking small government is simply that you’ve done the math and decided that markets are more efficient, then your libertarianism falls outside the scope of this post. However, most libertarians are people and therefore possessed of philosophical commitments, and I’d guess that most libertarians’ philosophical commitments have some connection to their political ones. (This would be a good time to mention that, in my judgment, a simple objection to gunpoint coercion is fine but doesn’t get you all the way to a theory of government. Given real-world political ambiguities—What about non-gunpoint-y “nudges?” What about systematic discrimination that is effectively as limiting as gunpoint coercion? What about the political reality that a dogmatically libertarian state just ain’t in the cards?—you need a little more.)